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History
1944: International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).
1968: ICAO starts working on MRTD.
◦ “A Machine Readable Travel Document (MRTD) is an
international travel document (eg. a passport or visa) containing
eye-and machine-readable data.” (ICAO).
1980: Standard DOC 9303 (ISO/IEC 7501 since 1991).
◦ Includes an OCR Machine Readable Zone.
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History
1988: Securing passports with chip: Davida & Desmedt
Eurocrypt’88.
1998: First (not ICAO-compliant) electronic passports in
Malaysia.
1998: ICAO initiated some work on biometric identification
systems and associated means.
2004: ICAO released a new version of DOC 9303, endorsed by
ISO/IEC 7501, that defines passports with biometrics and
contactless Integrated Circuit (IC), so-called ePassport.
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Integrated Circuit
IC is contactless.
IC does not contain any battery.
IC has a microprocessor.
Communication range is about 10 cm.
Memory (EEPROM) is about 32KB.
IC is compliant ISO 14443, ISO 7816.
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Machine Readable Zone
Line 1
◦ Document type
◦ Issuing country
◦ Holder name
Line 2
◦ Document number (+ checksum)
◦ Nationality
◦ Date of birth (+ checksum)
◦ Gender
◦ Date of expiry (+ checksum)
◦ Options
◦ Composite check digit
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Memory Content
Data groups (DG).
◦ Access requires an authentication: BAC or EAC.
List of data groups (COM).
Cryptographic material: certificate, signature and hashes (SOD).
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Passport Content
Logical Data Structure (LDS)
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CRYPTOGRAPHIC MECHANISMS
DEFINED BY ICAO
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ICAO Security Mechanisms
Overview
Passive Authentication
[Signature]Forging a fake passport
Modifying data of a given passport
SHA−1, 224 ,256 ,384, 512
RSA, DSA, ECDSA
Active Authentication
[Challenge Response]Cloning a given passport
ISO 9796−2
Basic Access Control
[Reader Authentication]Skimming a passport
TDES/CBC
Retail−MAC/DES
SHA−1 (key der.)
[Encryption]
Secure MessagingEavesdropping the communication
TDES/CBC
Retail−MAC/DES
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Passive Authentication
General Sketch
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Passive Authentication
Certificates
Passive authentication is a mandatory security mechanism.
EF.SOD (RFC 3369) contains the hash value of each present DG,
and a signature calculated by the issuing State over these values.
The signature can be checked using the Document Signer (DS)
X.509 certificate, available from EF.SOD or ICAO Public Key
Directory (PKD).
The DS certificate can be checked using the Country Signing CA
(CSCA) X.509 certificate.
◦ Originally, the ICAO PKD did not publish the CSCA certificates.
◦ CSCA certificates and revocation lists should be exchanged
according to bilateral agreements.
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Certificates in the ICAO Directory
Signature Number of certificates
RSA-1024 8
RSA-2048 3120
RSA-3072 2
ECDSA-224 31
ECDSA-256 40
Total 3201
Signature Schemes Used by DS Certificates
Signature Number of certificates
RSA-2048 4
RSA-3072 30
RSA-4096 90
ECDSA-256 14
ECDSA-384 6
Total 144
Signature Schemes Used by CSCA Certificates
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Certificates in the ICAO Directory
RSA Exponent Number of certificates
3 191
44591 1
65427 1
65537 2937
Total 3130
RSA Exponents in DS Certificates
RSA Exponent Number of certificates
3 9
38129 2
43459 1
65537 112
Total 124
RSA Exponents in CSCA Certificates
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Certificates in the ICAO Directory
Revoked DS Certificates
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New Zealand 2 2
Malaysia 3 3
AU 4 1 2 1
USA 3 1 2
UK 724 724
Canada 15 7 8
UNO 3 3
Singapore 6 3 3
Total 760 17 5 2 12 724
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Active Authentication
The Active Authentication is an optional security mechanism.
Aim is to prove that EF.SOD belongs to the authentic passport,
i.e. it is not a cloned one.
Two-pass CR protocol ISO 9796-2 DSS 1 (RSA, DSA, ECDSA).
Passport’s public key is stored in DG15 (encoded as RFC 3280).
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Active Authentication
Protocol
Reader (IFD) Passport (ICC)
Generate M2
M2−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Create T
Generate M1 of LM1bits
M = M1‖M ′2
H = hash(M)
F = 6A‖M1‖H‖T
S = ENCPrK(F )
S←−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Decrypt S ′ with PuKDG15
D = hash(M ′1‖M2)
Check if D = H ′
IFD: InterFace Device
ICC: Integrated Circuit Card
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Basic Access Control
General View
Reader
MAC Key
Kr, Kp
Basic Access Control
Secure Messaging
Encryption Key
Session Encryption Key
Session MAC Key
MRZ
Expiration Date
Birth Date
Passport Number
Reader
Passport
Authenticated Query
Encrypted Data
Passport
Cp
a = ENC(Cp, Cr, Kr),  MAC(a)
b = ENC(Cp, Cr, Kp),  MAC(b)
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Basic Access Control
Protocol
Reader (IFD) Passport (ICC)
Generate RNDICC
RNDICC←−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Generate RNDIFD
Generate KIFD
S = RNDIFD‖RNDICC‖KIFD
EIFD = ENCKENC(S)
MIFD = MACKMAC(EIFD)
EIFD‖MIFD−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Check MAC
Decrypt EIFD
If RND′ICC = RNDICC
Generate KICC
R = RNDICC‖RND′IFD‖KICC
EICC = ENCKENC(R)
MICC = MACKMAC(EICC)
EICC‖MICC←−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Kseed = KIFD ⊕ KICC Kseed = KIFD ⊕ KICC
Calculate KSENC Calculate KSENC
Calculate KSMAC Calculate KSMAC
Calculate SSC Calculate SSC
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Basic Access Control
Standards
Three-pass CR protocol according to ISO 11770-2 Key
Establishment Mechanism 6, 2-key 3DES as block cipher.
Nonces should be 8-byte long.
Encryption done using 3DES in CBC mode with zero-IV
according to ISO 11568-2.
A cryptographic checksum is calculated over: ISO 9797-1 MAC
Algorithm 3 (i.e. Retail-MAC), based on DES, zero-IV,
ISO 9797-1 Padding Method 2.
Encryption and MAC keys derived from the MRZ using SHA-1.
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Secure Messaging
Algorithms and Standards
The encryption uses 3DES in CBC mode with a zero IV, and a
padding compliant with ISO/IEC 9797-1 padding method 2.
The MAC is computed using ISO/IEC 9797-1 MAC algorithm 3
with DES, a zero IV, and the ISO/IEC 9797-1 padding method 2.
Before the MAC is computed, the Send Sequence Number is
incremented and prepended to the ciphertext.
The original value for SSD is the concatenation of the 4 less
significant bytes of each RNDICC and RNDIFD.
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Basic Access Control and Secure Messaging
Key Derivation
Kseed = trunc16(SHA-1 (MRZ info))
or (Kr ⊕ Kp).
Set D = Kseed ||00000001.
Compute H = SHA-1(D).
First 16 bytes of H are set to the
2-key 3DES KENC .
Set D = Kseed ||00000002.
Compute H = SHA-1(D).
First 16 bytes of H are set to the 2
DES keys KMAC .
Adjust the parity bits of DES keys.
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ADDITIONAL CRYPTOGRAPHIC
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Evolution
2004: Basic Access Control (BAC)
2009: Extended Access Control (EAC)
◦ EACv1, EACv2.
◦ EAC provides terminal authentication (TA) with a stronger
session key than BAC.
◦ EAC provides chip authentication (CA) without the AA
semantic problem.
2010: Supplemental Access Control (SAC)
◦ SAC improves BAC with more entropy.
◦ SAC uses PACE as an additional security mechanism.
◦ SAC must be implemented by EU countries by the end of 2014.
◦ By the end of 2017 only passports supporting SAC will be
considered to be ICAO-compliant.
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Extended Access Control
EAC uses Extended Access Keys, which can be either symmetric
or asymmetric, which cannot be derived from the MRZ.
Each country needs a Country Verifying CA (CVCA), which
issues Document Verifier (DV) Certificates. The public key of
the CVCA is stored in the passport.
CA enables the terminal (reader, inspection system) to
authenticate the passport and to establish a secure channel.
TA enables the chip (passport) to verify that the terminal is
allowed to access sensitive information such as biometric data.
TA may only be used together with CA.
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Terminal Authentication
Reader (IFD) Passport (ICC)
Certificate chain−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
VerifyPuKCVCA(DVc)
VerifyDVc(ISc)
Extract PuKIS from ISc
Generate RNDICC
RNDICC←−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Generate PrKIFD, PuKIFD (DH Keys)
C := hash(PuKIFD)
C−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Store C ′
S := IDICC‖RNDICC‖PuKIFD
signPrKIS(S) = sIFD
sIFD−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
VerifyPuKIS(sIFD)
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Chip Authentication
Reader (IFD) Passport (ICC)
PuKICC+Dc←−−−−−−−−−−−−−
PuKIFD−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Check if hashPuK′IFD = C ′
K = DH(PrKIFD,PuKICC,D
′) K = DH(PrKICC,PuKIFD,D ′)
Generate RNDICC
KENC = KDFENC(K ,RNDICC)
KMAC = KDFMAC(K ,RNDICC)
TICC = MACKMAC(PuKIFD)
RNDICC+TICC←−−−−−−−−−−−−−
KENC = KDFENC(K ,RNDICC)
KMAC = KDFMAC(K ,RNDICC)
VerifyKMAC(TICC)
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Password Authenticated Connection Establishment
As for the BAC, the shared secret (pi) is printed on the passport.
The secret pi is a Card Access Number or a MRZ-Password.
Reader and passport compute the key Kpi = SHA-1(pi‖3).
Passport and reader are authenticated using Kpi.
A DH key agreement protocol is performed to generate
encryption and mac keys.
The keys are no longer static (contrarily to BAC).
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Password Authenticated Connection Establishment
Reader (IFD) Passport (ICC)
Generate RNDICC
z = ENCKpi(RNDICC)
z+Dc←−−−−−−−−−−−−−
RND′ICC = DECKpi(z)
Compute De from RNDICC and Dc Compute De
Generate PrKIFD, PuKIFD Generate PrKICC, PuKICC
PuKIFD−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
PuKICC←−−−−−−−−−−−−−
K = KA(PrKIFD,PuKICC,D
′) K = KA(PrKICC,PuKIFD,D ′)
KENC = 128msb of SHA-1(K‖1) KENC = 128msb of SHA-1(K‖1)
KMAC = 128msb of SHA-1(K‖2) KMAC = 128msb of SHA-1(K‖2)
TIFD = MACKMAC(PuKICC)
TIFD−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Verify TIFD
TICC = MACKMAC(PuKIFD)
TICC←−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Verify TICC
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Vulnerabilities
Five vulnerabilities were identified so far in the literature.
Vulnerabilities on the protocol designs or their implementation.
Issues related to the certificates are not discussed here.
None of them allows an adversary to forge a passport.
◦ Recognition of a batch of passports (e.g., country).
◦ Recognition of an individual passport.
◦ Obtaining a proof of presence.
◦ Obtaining the data contained in the passport.
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1/5 MRZ Low Entropy
Fields No information Country known Visual access
Document number 1.02× 1014 from 6.76× 10
8
–
to 104
Date of birth 36525 days – 1825 days
Date of expiration 3652.5 days
from 3652.5 days
–
to 1250 days
Total
No information Country known Visual access Country+Visual
1.36× 1022 from 9.02× 10
16
6.8× 1020 from 4.51× 10
15
to 4.57× 1011 to 2.28× 1010
73.52 bits
from 56.32 bits
69.20 bits
from 52.00 bits
to 38.73 bits to 34.41 bits
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2/5 Response-Time Vulnerability
When the reader sends (Ciphertext, MAC) during BAC, the
passport recomputes MAC and compares it to the received one.
If they do not match, the passport sends an error message.
Otherwise it decrypts Ciphertext and check if RND′ICC = RNDICC
If they do not match the passport sends an error mesage.
Otherwise the BAC process continues.
Decrypting ciphertext and comparing nonces takes milliseconds.
This discloses if BAC failed at the MAC comparison (wrong key)
or at nonces comparison (correct key but unexpected nonce).
Chothia and Smirnov also noticed that old French passports send
a different error message when the BAC failed.
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3/5 Fingerprinting the Passport
Error messages.
Result of the select command (can be used before BAC).
Answer to select (ATS) depends on the implementation.
UID (random or not).
Response time to APDUs depends on the implementation.
Physical layer characteristics.
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4/5 MRZ Lookup Table (Italian Passport)
A vulnerability pointed out by Sportiello targets old generations
of Italian passports.
By manipulating the get challenge command (LE set to 01),
it is possible to force the passport to send a 8-byte challenge
with the 7 less significant bytes set to 00.
Probability that a given nonce appears is 1/28.
Perform a brute force attack on the MRZ space (CPA).
Precomputations are possible because it is a chosen plaintext
attack, encrypted with 3DES in CBC mode with an IV = 0 and
a key KENC derived from the MRZ.
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4/5 MRZ Lookup Table (Italian Passport)
Reader MITM ePassport
Get 8-byte challenge−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
1©
Get 1-byte challenge−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
RNDICC = NN‖{0x00}7
RNDICC
[
0
]
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−
if RNDICC
[
0
] 6= 0x00 : jump to 1©
RNDICC={0x00}8←−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Calculate S
EIFD = ENCKENC(S)
MIFD = MACKMAC(EIFD)
EIFD‖MIFD−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
EIFD‖MIFD−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Calculate R
EICC = ENCKENC(R)
MICC = MACKMAC(EICC)
EICC‖MICC←−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Lookup for KENC where :
ENCKENC({0x00}8) = EICC
EICC‖MICC←−−−−−−−−−−−−−
... ... ...
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5/5 Early Active Authentication
There exists passports that accept to execute AA before BAC.
Signature evidence.
Traceability attacks due to the RSA modulus.
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Conclusion
ICAO’s passport is a pretty well-defined secure application.
Complex security mechanisms.
Security weaknesses due to misuse and short time-to-market.
Security level is improved over time.
Avoine et al., A Survey of Security and Privacy Issues in the
ePassport Protocols, ACM Computing Surveys, 2016.
Gildas Avoine Biometric Passport from a Security Perspective 41
